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1 Introduction
The determinants of industrial or environmental accidents are numerous and their interactions
are complex. To design and implement proper control policies to reduce the probability and
severity of those accidents, those determinants and their interactions must be better under-
stood. We consider in this paper that those determinants or factors can be regrouped into three
diﬀerent sets: technological, eventual, and organizational. The ﬁrst set regroups all factors that
are directly linked to the characteristics of the products being handled, both inputs and outputs,
and their current production and distribution technologies. Clearly, handling relatively unsta-
ble, harmful or explosive chemicals is intrinsically more dangerous and producing or distributing
those products by using technologies that are relatively labor intensive or through urban areas
or on public transportation networks is also intrinsically more dangerous. The second set of
determinants or factors includes exogenous and in part uncontrollable purely random natural
events such as lightning, ﬂooding and even residual unavoidable human errors, which may ignite
a process leading more or less inexorably to an accident. Finally, the third set contains the
organizational characteristics which may contribute to the occurrence of a severe accident by
allowing more of less control, coordination or timely information transmission by and among
agents who may be called “stakeholders” in the occurrence of industrial or environmental ac-
cidents. This paper deals with this third set, namely the organizational factors which include
among others the institutional characteristics and informational asymmetries which constitutes
signiﬁcant background features.
More precisely, we study the impact of diﬀerent institutional and informational constraints in the
implementation of a public policy aimed at preventing environmental or industrial accidents. The
most important constraints to be taken into account are: limited liability (judgement proofness)
of ﬁrms; limited capacity of governments to intervene in business decisions and transactions,
which requires that governments use policy instruments that are either of the ex-ante regulation2
type, or of the ex-post liability type, including extended liability and ﬁnancial responsibility,
or of both types; limited power of the court system to search and ﬁnd all the facts relevant to
a judgement; asymmetric information between the agents, namely governments, ﬁrms, banks,
and courts, whose decisions and behavior may have an impact on the observed probability and
severity of environmental or industrial accidents.
We discuss in the following sections the institutional frameworks of the American and Euro-
pean liability systems, the speciﬁc roles of the four main actors in the determination of indus-
trial/environmental accidents and the relevant academic literature, before proceeding in section
4 with the presentation of our model followed by a section where the main results are discussed.
We conclude in section 7 with some policy recommendations.
2 The Internalization of Environmental Damage in the U.S. and
E u r o p et h r o u g hE x t e n d e dL i a b i l i t ya n dF i n a n c i a lR e s p o n s i -
bility
The term ‘ﬁnancial responsibility’ refers to the set of instruments with which potential pol-
luters can demonstrate ex ante that their ﬁnancial resources are adequate for the restoration
of environmental damage they may cause. In one practical application, ﬁnancial responsibility
requires that the authorization to carry out production activities in risky sectors be restricted to
ﬁrms who can demonstrate an appropriate ﬁnancial or insurance coverage for future obligations
resulting from the assignment of environmental liability.1
1Financial responsibility includes various kinds of instruments: letters of credit and surety bonds; cash accounts
and certiﬁcates of deposit; self-insurance and corporate guarantee (Boyd, 2002). Letters of credit and surety bonds
are purchased from banks or insurance companies; they require the latter to pay a third party beneﬁciary (often the
government) under speciﬁc circumstances, such as the failure of the purchaser to perform certain obligations. Cash
accounts and certiﬁcates of deposit place cash or some other form of interest-bearing security into accounts that
are assigned or made payable to a regulatory authority. Companies with relatively deep pockets may self-insure
to satisfy coverage requirements by demonstrating suﬃcient ﬁnancial strength. Finally, a corporate guarantee
allows another ﬁrm, such as a parent company, to satisfy the coverage requirement; ﬁnancial guarantors must
then explicitly agree to cover the liabilities of the ﬁrm.3
Financial responsibility has been widely applied in the United States since the 1980s within
the framework of the liability assignment system for environmental damage, particularly in the
U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) that
states that the owners and operators of a facility causing an accident are strictly liable for the
costs involved in cleaning up the contaminated sites and in compensating the victims.2
T h eU . S .e x p e r i e n c es h o w st h a tﬁnancial responsibility may be a (sometimes necessary) com-
plement to legislation on liability assignment of environmental damage. It is usually needed
to ensure that the damaged natural resources are reclaimed. Its diﬀerent applications all stem
from a common motivation, which is to ensure the proper internalization of the ﬁnancial burden
engendered by polluters in order to indemnify victims and discourage various forms of environ-
mental deterioration.
As in the U.S. system, the proposed EC system considers the need for instruments that foster
the internalizing of environmental damage in cases of insolvency and judgment-proofness of the
liable parties. In the wording of the Proposal:3 “The insolvency of operators is one factor that
may hinder cost recovery in line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle by competent authorities, but
t h ei m p a c to ft h i sm a yb el i m i t e db ya d e q u a t eﬁnancial insurance of potential damage” (page 4,
point 2). Thus the EC legislator recognizes an important role for ﬁnancial institutions, although
it does not speciﬁcally deﬁne any compulsory ﬁnancial security in order to meet the ﬂexibility
requirements of the new liability system. In fact, the Proposal states that “Financial assurance
of environmental liability is beneﬁcial for all stakeholders: for public authorities and the public
in general, it is one of the most eﬀective, if not the only, way of ensuring that restoration actually
2Financial responsibility is also provided for by CERCLA, by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), and by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).
Moreover, it is part of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and of the Oil Pollution Act (33
U.S.C. §2716 of 1990). Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can proceed promptly with
the clean up of contaminated sites with funding from the Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund, commonly
known as the Superfund. The fund is ﬁnanced through a combination of federal appropriations, industry taxes,
and penalties imposed under judgments entered against responsible parties.
3Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability with
regards to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage,C O M( 2 0 0 2 ) ,1 7ﬁnal, Brussels, January 23,
2002.4
takes place in line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle; for industry operators, it provides a way of
spreading risks and managing uncertainties; for the insurance industry, it is a sizeable market”
(page 7, point 4).
But while in the U.S., due to the legal provisions, ﬁnancial responsibility has evolved to provide
a wide array of ﬁnancial instruments tailored to individual ﬁrms and regulatory needs, in the EC
this kind of instrument has a corresponding importance but relatively little diﬀusion. In fact,
the White Paper4 (§ 4.9 “Financial security”) contains the following statement: “When looking
at the insurance market — insurance being one of the possible ways of having ﬁnancial security,
alongside, among others, bank guarantees, internal reserves or sector-wise pooling systems — it
appears that coverage of environmental damage risks is still relatively undeveloped, but there
is clear progress being made in parts of the ﬁnancial markets specializing in this area.” The
imposition of such instrument also seems to be delayed in time, as indicated by the statement
that “...the EC regime should not impose an obligation to have ﬁnancial security, in order to
allow the necessary ﬂexibility as long as experience with the new regime still has to be gathered.
The provision of ﬁnancial security by the insurance and banking sectors for the risks resulting
from the regime should take place on a voluntary basis.” This, however, disregards the fact
that ﬁnancial responsibility instruments have already been made mandatory within individual
Member States.5
From an economic point of view, the enforcement of ﬁnancial responsibility ensures that the
expected costs related to environmental risks are recorded in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet and ac-
counts. Since ﬁnancial guarantees are purchased from banks or insurance companies, a contract
relation is established that makes the latter keen on protecting their investment, for instance by
4White Paper on Environmental Liability,C O M( 2 0 0 0 ) ,6 6ﬁnal, Brussels, February 9, 2000.
5For example in Italy, the Ministero dell’Ambiente, in a decree of October 8, 1996, deﬁned the method for
granting ﬁnancial guarantees in favor of the State by companies that carry out waste transportation activities re-
lated to reclaiming, restoration of site conditions, waste transportation and disposal, as well as the reimbursement
of any further damage caused to the environment. Another example is the Flemish experience - in particular the
proposals of the Interuniversity Commission for the revision of environmental law in the Flemish region, which
has provided for elaborate provisions concerning ﬁnancial guarantees (Faure and Grimeaud 2000).5
monitoring the production activity of their corporate customers. As in the economic models of
lenders’ liability found in the literature, the bank, acting as principal in a ﬁnancial responsibil-
ity regime, is encouraged to monitor the environmental risk prevention activity of its corporate
customers. The agent ﬁrm, in turn, pays to the principal the cost associated with its risk level
(through possibly the cost of the loan), and is therefore encouraged to adopt preventive measures
to reduce its risk and, as a result, its total borrowing costs.
In this respect, the “ﬁnancial guarantors” may provide a remedy to information asymmetry
issues — in particular those involving moral hazard — through monitoring. They may also help
addressing issues related to adverse selection, through contract design and by setting an appro-
priate loan cost, thereby oﬀering lower cost guarantees to ﬁrms that make less risky choices from
an environmental standpoint and to those that implement prevention schemes (Feess and Hege
2000, 2003).
The eﬃciency of extending liability to the ﬁrm’s major partners, as part of the broader policy
issue of preventing environmental and/or industrial accidents, has been recently addressed in
the literature, as a principal-agent problem between a bank or ﬁnancier and a ﬁrm.6 Extending
environmental liability becomes a crucial factor once a ﬁrm has reached the stage of judgment-
proofness (Shavell 1986) a problem which arises when identiﬁed polluters prove unable to pay
for the damages they caused.7 Given that they may fail to pay the full cost associated with
the environmental damage, ﬁrms face weaker incentives to implement preventive measures at an
eﬃcient level.
6Numerous contributions have appeared recently in the literature addressing the question of lenders’ liability:
see for instance Beard (1990), Pitchford (1995, 2001), Heyes (1996), Boyer and Laﬀont (1996, 1997), Boyd and
Ingberman (1997), Balkenborg (2001), and Lewis and Sappington (2001), Boyer and Porrini (2004), Gobert and
Poitevin (2004).
7Judgment-proofness is not necessarily connected with ﬁrm size: “History has unfortunately shown that even
companies with limited ﬁnancial means may cause huge environmental damage and may thereafter be judgment-
proof. Moreover, the insolvency risk may even arise with larger companies since almost all (larger) companies
are organized as legal entities and therefore enjoy the beneﬁts of the limited liability of the corporation” (Faure
2001, p. 192).6
A particular case of extended lenders’ liability stems from signiﬁcant jurisprudence in the United
States. Under the CERCLA-based system of strict liability of the polluting ﬁrms, the notion of
owner and operator used in the wording of the law was gradually extended to include lenders
who were particularly active in supervising the ﬁrm’s operations. In so doing, the court have
been instrumental in ﬁnding deep-pocket parties to compensate victims and pay for clean-up
costs caused by insolvent ﬁrms.8 In the case United States v. Mirabile (Environmental Law
Reports 20, 994 (E.D. Pa 1985)), the bank was found liable for the damage because the Court
found that it had been signiﬁcantly involved in the supervision of the ﬁrm’s operations. The
Court stated that in this case, the ﬁrm’s lenders could be considered as operators and, as such,
the so-called “secured creditor exemption clause” was not applicable, and therefore that the
bank was liable for the damage under CERCLA regulation. In another case, United States v.
Maryland Bank and Trust (632 F. Supp. 573 (d. Md. 1986)), the Court stated that the bank
was liable for the decontamination costs based on the fact that it became the owner of the plant
after the closing of the ﬁrm before the damage was identiﬁed. In contrast with the previous case,
no consideration was given to the fact that the bank had been involved or not in the decisions
made with respect to the polluting substances. Rather, the lender’s liability was established
on the sole ground that the bank had become the owner of the property. Finally, in the case
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. (901 F. 2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. Denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991)), the bank was deemed liable for the decontamination costs based on the fact that
its ﬁnancing of the ﬁrm had conferred it the ability to inﬂuence management, even if it had
not been directly involved in the ﬁrm’s operations. This rule would provide for lenders to be
considered parties to the management of the ﬁrm simply because, in granting the loan, they
could if they wished force their clients to carry out preventive actions against environmental
abuses and/or may review their preventive practices.
In this vein, it is possible to deﬁne a form of “extended principal-agent liability,” under which
liability is shared between the ﬁrm and its ﬁnancier, thereby giving ﬁnancial institutions an
8See Boyer and Porrini (2002) for a discussion of that jurisprudence.7
incentive to properly identify and monitor risky ﬁrms. This is the modeling strategy we use
in this paper. It implies an active preventive role for ﬁnancial institutions through ﬁnancial
responsibility in the spirit of the proposed common liability system mentioned in a European
Community Directive.9 Imposing liability on ﬁnancial institutions is thus not seen any more
simply as a way to relax the ﬁrms’ resources constraint. Rather, in the new system, the legislator
will delegate to ﬁnancial institutions part of its control upon the ﬁrms’ preventive behavior by
inducing them to internalize environmental damage.
Rather than an extended liability system, we will consider a liability sharing system under which
the bank is responsible for a ﬁxed part (percentage) of the damage caused - even in the case
where the ﬁrm actually has the ﬁnancial resources to cover more than its complementary part
of the damage. With the implementation of a liability sharing system the banks are called upon
to inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ environmental prevention activities through diﬀerent forms of monitoring
or incentive ﬁnancial contracts when the banks suﬀer from an asymmetric information structure
regarding the ﬁrms’ preventive activities.
However the principal-agent relationship between the bank and the ﬁrm is only part of the
complex network of relationships that characterizes the business environment of a ﬁrm whose
activities give rise to a probability of industrial/environmental accident. Thus, we will also
consider explicitly the behavior and decisions of other parties, such as governments and courts.
In a sense, the role of providing incentives for preventive environmental care by monitoring ﬁrms’
activities is shared between regulatory bodies, ﬁrms and courts.10
9The European Parliament and the Council, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, Joint text approved
by the Conciliation Committee, Brussels, 10 March 2004.
10An important point is then the comparison of ex ante and ex post instruments; see Boyer and Porrini (2001,
2004).8
3 Environmental Protection Policy: The Roles of Government,
Financial Institutions, Firms, and Courts
The environmental economics literature on lenders’ liability mainly applies the principal-agent
framework to the relationship between ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions. In this paper we extend
the concept of principal-agent liability to include other relationships that are important de-
terminants of the industrial/environmental safety decisions aimed at preventing environmental
accidents.
The ﬁrst kind of relationship is the one between ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institutions. Our model will
take into account the recent trend described above with respect to the instrument of ﬁnancial
responsibility. Thus insurance companies and banks can be called upon to provide ﬁnancial
guarantees for ﬁrms that operate in risky sectors. Informational asymmetries are present in
this relationship and want to model the monitoring role that can be played by the ﬁnancial
institutions regarding the prevention care activities implemented by ﬁrms.
T h es e c o n dk i n do fr e l a t i o n s h i pi st h eo n eb e t w e e nﬁrms and the government/legislator. The gov-
ernment/legislator determines a recommended level of safety and sets the rule to share liability
between the ﬁrm and the ﬁnancial institution. Unlike other contributions, such as Balkenborg’s
(2004), which consider a punitive liability that can exceed the damage costs, our model is built
on a full liability that covers all but only the damage costs. In the model, the sharing rule takes
into account the incentives towards the optimal level of prevention in a framework that is again
characterized by the presence of informational asymmetries about the prevention decisions of
the ﬁrms.
Finally, the third kind of relationship is the one between ﬁrms and courts. The courts are called
upon to decide if and when ﬁrms are negligent in choosing a level of prevention that is lower
than the level recommended by government. Also, ﬁnancial institutions may have an interest in9
suing ﬁrms that are (or appear to be) guilty of insuﬃcient preventive action, with the intent of
recovering from them their part of the shared burden.
This model developed here includes the three types of relationships described above between
the four actors involved: ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions, government/legislator, and courts. In the
literature addressing the choice of instruments to implement an environmental policy, the focus
is generally on one of these relationships only. But in a realistic framework meant to design
an optimal policy, it is clearly necessary to consider the roles of all four actors, in particular if
one wishes to account for the optimal delegation to ﬁnancial institutions of the monitoring of
prevention activities realized by the ﬁrms.
Thus although this paper will not explicitly address the issue of the comparison between ex
ante and ex post regulations, the role of the courts in evaluating (ex post)t h eﬁrm’s behavior is
connected to the command-and-control standards set by ex ante regulation. In this sense, the
role of providing incentives for preventive care by the means of monitoring activities is shared
between regulatory agencies and the courts (Boyer and Porrini 2001). Working in this direction,
Boyer and Porrini (2004) compare ex ante and ex post environmental regulation by modeling a
liability system, where liability is extended to the ﬁnancial partners of the ﬁrm when the ﬁrm
goes bankrupt following an environmental accident, and an incentive regulation system, where
the environmental protection agency may be “captured” by the regulated ﬁrms. Their model
integrates the following variables and features, whose eﬀects on the choice of instrument for
environmental protection is characterized: limited liability; the cost of low and high levels of
preventive care; the non observability of care; the social cost of public funds; the (net) prof-
itability of the ﬁrm; the level of damages if an accident occurs; and ﬁnally a regulatory capture
factor. They show that a relatively large cost of care favors the extended liability regime because
the captured regulator regime would imply too much care, or too few environmental accidents,
and too much ﬁnancing of risky business, that is, an over-development of environmentally risky
industries. This is due to the fact that the social value of the informational rents so allowed10
is not large enough to compensate for the social cost of the extra care activities. They also
show that a relatively low cost of public funds, i.e. a relatively eﬃcient (nondiscretionary) tax-
ation system, favors the captured regulator regime because the extended lender liability regime
would imply too little care and too little ﬁnancing. This is because the beneﬁts of a reduced
expected cost of environmental accidents are not large enough to compensate for the loss of
proﬁts (informational rents), whose social cost is small when the cost of public funds is low.
Finally, they show that a larger regulatory capture factor favors the extended liability regime:
the captured regulator induces too much preventive care and hence too few accidents, allowing
the ﬁrm to reap a costly informational rent. Hence, the best instrument in terms of social wel-
fare may not be the one which ensures the better environmental protection as measured by the
lower probability of environmental accidents. In a similar vein, Hutchison and van’t Veld (2004)
consider a context where some care activities (unobservable) reduce the probability of accident
while others (observable) reduce the level of damage if an accident occurs. In such a context,
extended liability improves welfare but does not induce the ﬁrst-best levels of care. With free
entry and exit in the industry, extended liability generates too much exit (although second-best
optimal given the levels of care). The authors show that if the regulator is constrained to one
instrument only, then direct regulation of the observable type of care strictly welfare dominates
extended liability.
Referring to the law and economics literature, principal-agent liability relates to cases where
instead of a single actor as injurer, harm is caused by an individual or a ﬁrm that is under
the control or supervision of someone else. Principal-agent schemes are applied to analyze
cases in which liability is extended from the person that directly caused the damage to a party
that is in some sense related to that person. This is the so-called “secondary” or “vicarious”
liability (Sykes 1984; Kornhauser 1982), such as that of the parents who are deemed liable for
damage caused by their children, or the employer who is deemed liable for the damage caused
by the activities of its employees. Some aspects remain to be developed in modeling this form of
delegated control, including the presence and possible eﬀects of monitoring costs (Dari Mattiacci11
and Parisi 2004) as well as the deﬁnition of the optimal sharing rule between the principal and
the agent in terms of ex ante incentives to undertake the optimal level of prevention activities.
In Polinsky (2003) the assignment of liability to the principal is crucial to achieve the optimal
level of prevention in three cases. The ﬁrst case is when the agent’s risk aversion lowers the
optimal level of liability that the agent himself should bear as for instance, in product liability
analysis when the harm is accidental in character. The second case relates to the principal’s
formal monitoring role when it is diﬃcult to determine whether the agent caused harm; in such
circumstances, a strictly liable principal has a strong incentive to control her agents’ preventive
behavior. The third case is the judgment-proofness of the agent, which induces him to carry out
inadequate prevention activities and, again, renders important the monitoring role of a liable
principal that will be called upon to compensate part of the damage.
Among other contributions, Newman and Wright (1990) address the problem of deﬁning a
principal-agent liability framework where moral hazard is also being considered. In particular,
the authors examine the socially optimal level of prevention compared with the level achieved
under strict liability in the case where an environmental/industrial accident is caused by em-
ployees’ action. Given that the preferences of the employee/agent diﬀer from those of the em-
ployer/principal and the agent’s prevention activities are unobservable, a moral hazard problem
arises and the principal’s strict liability will inﬂuence the choice of employment contract oﬀered.
The law and economics literature represents principal-agent liability as a framework where maxi-
mizing agents choose their preventive care level under the monitoring activities of some principal
(Shavell 2004). In these models there is no room for considering how the agent’s prevention de-
cision may be inﬂuenced by factors other than the maximization hypothesis and the principal’s
inﬂuence. Daughety and Reinganum (2003) proposed to widen the standard law and economics
literature framework by assuming that market and the tort system interact to aﬀect the deci-
sion about prevention care level with reference to product liability. In particular, their analysis12
includes an endogenously-determined ﬁxed-cost component to prevention that comes from the
characteristics of the output market, the relevant litigation costs, a representation of victims
as a consumer, a group of consumers or third parties, and a variety of imperfectly competitive
market structures.11
In this paper we analyze extended liability and consider as liable parties the ﬁnancial institutions
that provide ﬁnancial resources for production activities that may be environmentally risky.
Thus with respect to the law and economics literature described above, we widen the traditional
framework by adopting the legislator’s point of view which, in these cases, is to determine what
mix of liability to impose on the principal and the agent in order to maximize a social welfare
criteria. However this maximum welfare depends upon the incentives the ﬁrm as the agent
faces given its ﬁnancial contract with the bank. When the ﬁrm’s preventive care behavior is
observable by the bank, the ﬁnancial contract can impose a speciﬁc level of preventive measures
as a condition for ﬁnancing the ﬁrm. In general, social optimum is achieved in a full information
setting by having one party or the other bear full responsibility for the damages. However, if
the ﬁrm is subject to limited liability, the damage may not be fully internalized when holding
the ﬁrm solely liable for the accidents it causes and, therefore, some liability should be assigned
to the bank as principal in order to achieve socially optimal care.
The case of incomplete information is considered in Segerson and Tietenberg(1992). They as-
sume the existence of moral hazard related to the contract with standard debt and risk sharing.
In this case, the ﬁnancial contract cannot directly depend on the ﬁrm’s prevention eﬀort. It is
thus socially optimal to assign liability to the ﬁrm, i.e. to the informed party, until the damage
cost is fully internalized. However, within a system of limited liability this may be unenforceable
and may impede full damage internalization, leading to a sub-optimal prevention eﬀort. The
authors suggest making up for the limited liability problem by deﬁning non-monetary penalties,
including criminal prosecution for decision-makers and managers, in case of accident.
11See Woodﬁeld (1004) for a discussion of liability Internet Service Providers may incur for transporting content
material which violates copyrights.13
Pitchford (1995) develops a model of a judgment-proof ﬁrm, a lender and a victim in which a
full lender liability policy can increase accident frequency and reduce eﬃciency. Under moral
hazard and limited liability, the prevention eﬀort is sub-optimal, hence the search for some
liability sharing between the ﬁrm and its lender as a mechanism to bridge in part the gap
between actual and optimal unobservable eﬀorts to reduce the probability of accident, whose
damage is known. The loan contract considered by Pitchford provides for payments conditional
upon the occurrence or not of an accident. The prevention eﬀort level chosen by the ﬁrm depends
then on the diﬀerence between the loan reimbursement by the ﬁrm in the two states, accident
and no-accident. If the creditor or lender “cannot observe the precautionary choice undertaken
by the ﬁrm, and if that ﬁrm is potentially judgment-proof, then increasing the liability of the
creditor can lead to an increase in the probability of accident” (page 1182), due to the fact
that the creditor, requiring that a proper insurance-like premium be paid by the ﬁrm in the
no-accident case reduces the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the two states and therefore
reduces incentives for care: the ﬁrm gets no proﬁt in the accident case and a reduced proﬁti n
the no-accident case due to the higher insurance premium. Pitchford concludes that the optimal
lenders’ liability level from an accident prevention standpoint is equal to the amount of the ﬁrm’s
available capital, that is, the project value added plus the equity invested. If lender liability is
lower or higher than this level, the contract ends up providing an incentive for the ﬁrm to lower
its prevention eﬀort.
Boyer and Laﬀont (1997) studied the lenders’ liability issue with a two-period model, including
ar e ﬁnancing decision in the second period. This decision is made in an incomplete information
setting, which may alternatively take the form of moral hazard on the prevention eﬀort and of
adverse selection on the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm is liable for the accident damage up
to the value of its assets and the bank is liable for the residual damage. In the ﬁrst period,
the bank oﬀers a loan contract. If the ﬁrm accepts, it makes a prevention eﬀort and achieves
a ﬁrst period proﬁt. At the beginning of the second period, the bank must decide whether to
reﬁnance the ﬁrm or not, a decision which is used in the adverse selection case, to elicit truthful14
revelation of the ﬁrst period proﬁt level. If the ﬁrm is reﬁnanced, another proﬁt is realized
and an environmental accident may or may not occur. In the moral hazard case, Boyer and
Laﬀont conclude by advising against full lender liability, i.e. a liability rule by which, following
a major accident which makes the ﬁrm bankrupt, the bank pays the total amount of damage
and recovers whatever it can from the ﬁrm’s assets. The private contract solution approaches
the socially optimal solution if the bank’s liability is deﬁned as a share of such damage. The
authors derive a formula for the optimal bank extended liability share, which depends on the
model’s parameters, and particularly upon the cost of public funds.
Hiriart and Martimort (2004) consider the optimal regulation of a risky project where a buyer
(principal) has a contract with a seller (agent). The information on the level of safety care
exerted by the agent is private to the agent (moral hazard). The authors derive conditions
under which extending liability to the principal (buyer) improves social welfare. They show that
if the principal has all the bargaining power, then extended liability favors the internalization
of environmental damage and so improves welfare. However, when principals are competitive,
extending liability has no value under complete contracting. But if the buyer-seller relation is
plagued by adverse selection problems, then extending liability can again contribute to raising
welfare.
4 The Model
We consider that safety activity levels and therefore environmental or industrial accidents are
the result of interactions between, and choices made by four actors: the government, the ﬁrm,
the ﬁnancier, and the court. We model the role of each actor as follows.
The government decides on the liability system, that is the liability rules and the standards
for safety. The liability system may take diﬀerent forms combining strict and/or negligence
based liability, joint and several and/or distributed liability between the diﬀerent parties. The15
safety standards are also determined by the government and they stipulate the proper or socially
desirable behavior recommended to or imposed on ﬁrms. As discussed above, the jurisprudence
of extended lender liability and ﬁnancial responsibility requirements in the US under CERCLA,
in Canada and in Europe, can be considered as diﬀerent forms of shared liability. Building on
such jurisprudence, we model the government role as maximizing a social welfare function in
setting a (strict) liability sharing formula for accident damage between the bank and the ﬁrm,
as well as setting safety care standards for the ﬁrms. In exchange for its involvement in covering
the cost of accidents as a deep pocket provider, the bank will be given a right to sue the ﬁrm
for negligence in order to recuperate some or all its accident liability costs.
The ﬁrm decides on care activities, that is, the design and implementation of a safety program
of self-protection or care activities, which can reduce the probability of an accident.12 In most
cases, the safety plan itself can be considered as observable by all parties but its implementation
is much more diﬃcult to observe and must therefore, at least to some extent, be considered
as unobservable by external parties. We therefore consider a moral hazard context where the
ﬁrm chooses the level of care, which is a private information of the ﬁrm. Under the government
chosen strict liability sharing formula, the ﬁrm is strictly responsible for its share of the cost of
an accident and for reimbursing the bank’s share if it is found guilty of negligence.
The ﬁnancial institutions (we will refer to those institutions as banks although in many cases
they could be insurers or other ﬁnancial syndicates) make possible the operations of the ﬁrm
and, through their involvement in the ﬁrms’ aﬀairs, undertaken to protect their ﬁnancial interest
(loan, equity, and guarantees), can be considered as potentially eﬃcient supervisors of the ﬁrm’s
safety care program. In the Fleet Factor case,13 t h ej u d g ew r o t e :
“Although similar, the phrase ‘participating in management’ and the term ‘operator’
12We do not consider here self-insurance activities which could reduce the cost or severity of an accident if and
when such an accident occurs.
13United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. (901 F. 2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. Denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991)).
For a discussion of that case, see Boyer and Laﬀont (1996).16
are not congruent. Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur
...liability without being an operator, by participating in the ﬁnancial management
of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to inﬂuence the corporation’s treatment
of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually involve
itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable – although
such conduct will certainly lead to the loss of the protection of the statutory [secured
creditor] exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in
management decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will
be liable, if its involvement with the management of the facility is suﬃciently broad
to support the inference that it could aﬀect hazardous waste disposal decisions if
it so chose. We therefore speciﬁcally reject the formulation of the secured creditor
exemption suggested by the district court in Mirabile.”
We model the role of the bank as ﬁnancing the ﬁrm through a loan contract. Under the govern-
ment chosen strict liability sharing formula, the ﬁrm is responsible for its share of the cost of an
accident. However, to represent the bank monitoring capacity, we assume that the liability rule
allows it to sue its client ﬁrm for negligence in order to recover its share of the accident cost, if
it thinks that the ﬁrm has been careless in preventing accidents, that is, has been negligent by
exerting a level of care lower than the level required by the government determined standards.
If the bank decides to sue the ﬁrm following an accident, then the case is argued in court.
The court is responsible for deciding on liability or breach of contract in litigation cases. The
court is therefore seen as in part responsible for implementing the government policy regarding
the liability sharing formula and the safety care standards. In so doing, the court imperfectly
assesses the level of care exerted by the ﬁrm and ﬁnds the ﬁrm guilty of insuﬃc i e n tc a r eo r
negligence if this assessed level is lower than the level required by the safety care standards set
by the government. If found guilty, the ﬁrm either reimburses the bank for the latter’s share of17
the cost of the accident if it can do so or goes bankrupt if it cannot.14
The game unfolds as follows. The government ﬁrst decides on the liability sharing rule and the
level of safety care standard: in so doing, it makes the ﬁrm strictly responsible for a share of
α% of the cost of an industrial accident while it makes the bank strictly responsible for a share
of (1 − α)% of that cost, including both clean-up costs and compensation for victims. We will
assume that the cost of an accident is known to be L. In spite of the fact that liability is strict
in the sense that payments for damages are made in the above proportions to aﬀected parties,
the government also sets a minimum standard s for the level of safety a ﬁrm should undertake.
The standard s is legally enforceable by courts in the following sense. Given the occurrence of
an accident generating damages L, the bank can sue the ﬁrm in court to recuperate its part
(1 − α)L of the cost of an accident, which, under the strict liability rule, it has already paid in
lieu of clean-up costs or compensation to the victims.
Although the level of safety care exerted by the ﬁrm is a private information of the ﬁrm, the
bank is allowed to sue the ﬁrm in case of an accident to recuperate its share of the cost. In order
to induce the ﬁrm to exert a proper level of care, the bank chooses the probability ν with which
it will sue the ﬁrm in case of accident and in so doing incurs a cost C(ν). This cost corresponds
to maintaining within the bank a legal apparatus capable of launching court cases and arguing
negligent behavior by client ﬁrms responsible for accidents; the expected number of such cases
depends directly on the probability ν. Litigation costs supported by the ﬁrm are simply CF
and are assumed to be incurred only if the ﬁrm is sued. If the court ﬁnds the ﬁrm guilty of an
insuﬃcient level of safety care, the ﬁrm must compensate the bank for the latter’s share of the
cost of the accident if it can do it (if the ﬁrm is solvent) and goes bankrupt if it cannot, in which
case the bank seizes the ﬁrm’s assets but cannot recuperate the residual part of the cost it has
14There is a ﬁfth group of stakeholders in the determination of the probability and severity of accidents, namely
the customers of the ﬁrm. Insofar as these customers internalize or not in their buying behavior the industrial or
environmental risk that the products they buy represent or cause, they in a sense contribute to the occurrence
of such accidents. Boyer, Mahenc and Moreaux (2004) develop an analysis of the impact of the environmental
awareness of buyers. We do not consider such an impact in this paper.18
incurred.
To avoid the daunting task of explicitly modeling the process by which the ﬁrm is found guilty
or not, we adopt a simple reduced form description of the court’s complex and imperfect process.
We assume that given s and q there is a probability denoted by P(q,s) ∈ [0,1] that the ﬁrm
will be found guilty for violating the recommended standard. For example, the court cannot
perfectly observe the level of care but rather can observe a signal ˜ q of the ﬁrm’s care level
with E(˜ q)=q (imperfect but unbiased veriﬁability). We assume that the court’s complex and
imperfect process is such that the probability P(q,s) is decreasing at a decreasing rate as the ﬁrm
exert more safety care (Pq < 0,P qq > 0). We also assume that a tightening of the government
determined standard s increases ceteris paribus the probability that the ﬁrm will be found guilty
(Ps > 0).
Hence, the ﬁrms are subject to both a strict liability rule for α% of the cost of an accident
and a liability for negligence rule. It is important to notice though that the liability for neg-
ligence, which may reach (1 − α)L for fully solvent ﬁrms and less for judgement proof ﬁrms,
is incurred only if the bank decides to sue the ﬁrm and the court ﬁnds the ﬁrm guilty, which
occurs under imperfect observation of the level of care exerted by the ﬁrm.15 Firms and banks
negotiate a standard Townsend-Gale-Hellwig loan contract. We assume that the ﬁrm needs a
loan of K to operate. The ﬁrm invests the amount borrowed K in a risky project. The project
generates proﬁts of π1 with probability μ and π2 with probability 1 − μ,w i t hπ2 >π 1.A n
industrial/environmental accident with loss L occurs with probability p(q) ∈ (0,1) with p(q)
decreasing and convex (p0(q) < 0a n dp00(q) > 0). The amount to be repaid by the ﬁrm to the
bank is simply (1 + r)K where r is the competitive interest rate for the risk class the ﬁrm and
15This modeling strategy diﬀers from the more usual negligence rule under which non-negligent ﬁrms are exempt
from liability. See for instance Innes (2004) for a model where the government chooses in an integrated way the
liability design, enforcement, and regulatory policy when the probability of accident depends on care activities.
He shows that the ex-ante regulation of care may be more eﬃcient than ex-post liability even if monitoring care is
relatively expensive. See Boyer, Lewis and Liu (2000) for a model where the cost of monitoring aﬀects the setting
of standards for care. See also Shavell (1993), Viscusi (1989), and Boyer and Porrini (2001) for comparisons
between ex-ante regulatory policies and ex-post liability schemes.19
the industry belong to.16
We solve the above three stage game by backward induction as we are looking for subgame perfect
equilibria. In stage 1, the government sets the values of α and s to maximize social welfare. In
stage 2, the ﬁrm and the bank negotiate a loan contract (r,K) and the bank announces its choice
of ν, the probability with which it will sue the ﬁrm in case of an accident. This probability is
set before observing whether an accident occurs or not, and the bank is committed to apply this
probability of suing the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm, knowing ν, chooses the safety care level q at cost Q(q)
(we assume Q0(q) > 0a n dQ00(q) > 0), implying a probability of accident of p(q). The total
amount to be paid by the ﬁrm to the bank will therefore depend on both ν and q,a sw e l la so n
α and s. In stage 3, all actors observe whether an accident occurs or not. If an accident occurs,
the bank sues the ﬁrm with probability ν; if the bank sues the ﬁrm, the court is called into play
and ﬁnds the ﬁrm guilty of negligence with probability P(q,s), in which case the ﬁrm makes the
additional payment (1 − α)L if it can do so and otherwise go bankrupt while its assets, valued
for the bank at max{0,π 1 − αL − (1 + r)K − Q(q) − CF}, are seized by the bank.
The third stage
In the third stage, the court is called into action if an accident occurred and the bank sued the
ﬁrm for breach of contract, that is, for (alleged) insuﬃcient care. If a suit is brought against
the ﬁrm, the court ﬁnds the ﬁrm liable with probability P(q,s). Therefore, in stage 3, the bank
realizes an expected net cash ﬂow EΠB which depends on whether an accident occurred or not,
on whether a suit is brought or not, on the ﬁndings of the court, and on the proﬁts realized by
the ﬁrm which determines the ﬁrm’s capacity to avoid bankruptcy. Given our assumption of a
standard Townsend-Gale-Hellwig loan contract, those proﬁts are strictly observed by the bank
and the court only if, following the court’s decision, the ﬁrm is not fully reimbursing the bank
16Typically, banks do not charge ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rates but rather interest rates based on deﬁned risk
classes. Once the risk class of the ﬁrm is determined and the rate of interest ﬁxed, the bank nevertheless will
typically monitor carefully its ﬁnancial interest in the ﬁrm.20
as instructed by the court, a situation which will indeed occur only if proﬁts are low.
The total expected proﬁt of the bank EΠB is therefore:
EΠB(ν,q,α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ)=( 1+r)K − C(ν)








By assumption, the bank always receives a repayment of (1 + r)K and the cost of the bank’s
strategy (the probability ν with which it sues the ﬁrm) is borne whether an accident occurs or
not. In the accident state, occurring with probability p(q), the bank suﬀers a loss which may take
three diﬀerent values: (i) a loss of (1−α)L if it does not sue the ﬁrm for negligence, or if it sues
the ﬁrm but the ﬁrm is found not guilty by the court, (ii) a loss of 0 if it sues the ﬁrm and the
ﬁrm, when found guilty of negligence by the court, can reimburse the bank for the latter’s share
(1−α)L of the accident cost, or (iii) a loss of [(1−α)L−max{0,π 1−αL−(1+r)K−Q(q)−CF}]
if it sues the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm is found guilty of negligence by the court while proﬁts are too
low to allow the ﬁrm to fulﬁll its obligations, in which case the ﬁrm goes bankrupt and the bank
gets only partial reimbursement of its share of the accident cost. The third term above indicates
that the ﬁrm’s expenses (1 + r)K − Q(q) − CF as well as the liability expenses αL are covered
in priority before the bank can get some of its liability expenses reimbursed. We further assume
(see below) that when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt, the (operating) expenses (1 + r)K − Q(q) − CF
are covered before the ﬁrm’s liability expenses αL. We will concentrate our analysis to the more
interesting case where, if the ﬁrm is sued and found guilty of negligence, situation (ii) would
occur when proﬁts are high (πt = π2) while situation (iii) would occur when proﬁts are low
(πt = π1).
Similarly, the total expected proﬁto ft h eﬁrm EΠF can be written as follows where Eπ =21
μπ1 +( 1− μ)π2 :
EΠF(q,ν,α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ)=Eπ − Q(q) − (1 + r)K
−p(q)(1 − ν)
h












The ﬁrm’s extra payment in case of an accident can take three diﬀerent forms: (i) if it is not sued
for negligence by the bank, the ﬁrm pays its liability expenses αL if it can do so, that is if it can
avoid bankruptcy (recall that bankruptcy can occur if proﬁt is low, in which case the ﬁrm, being
protected by limited liability, will not pay more than min{αL, π1−Q(q)−(1+r)K}), (ii) if sued
by the bank but found not guilty by the court, the ﬁrm is in a situation similar to the previous
one except for the additional litigation cost CF, (iii) if sued and found guilty, the ﬁrm reimburses
the bank if it can (when proﬁti sπ2), in which case it covers the full cost of the accident, or
goes bankrupt and pays at most its assets value given by max{0,π 1 − Q(q) − CF − (1 + r)K}
to cover its liability expense L.
No decision is made in stage 3. It is just recording the unfolding of the game. If no accident
occurs, the ﬁrm repays (1+r)K. If an accident occurs but the bank does not sue the ﬁrm, then
the latter repays (1 + r)K while the bank and the ﬁrm support their respective share of the
cost of the accident. If an accident occurs and the bank sues the ﬁrm but the court ﬁnds the
ﬁrm not guilty, then again the latter repays (1+r)K while the bank and the ﬁrm support their
respective share of the cost of the accident and the ﬁrm supports its litigation costs. Finally,
if an accident occurs, the bank sues the ﬁrm, and the court ﬁnds the ﬁrm guilty of negligence,
then the latter repays the loan (1 + r)K and covers its share of the accident costs αL plus the
bank’s share of the accident costs (1 − α)L if proﬁts are π2, but repays only its net proﬁts or
assets value and goes bankrupt otherwise.22
The second stage
In the second stage, the bank and the ﬁrm, observing the government determined values of α
and s, choose respectively ν and q with the bank acting as ﬁrst mover.17 Let us ﬁrst consider
t h ec h o i c eo fs a f e t yc a r eq made by the ﬁrm as a function of the predetermined and observed
values of α, s and ν.T h eﬁrm chooses the level of q which maximizes its expected proﬁt( 2 ) .
Safety care activities aﬀects the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts through three channels: ﬁrst, through
the probability p(q) of an accident; second, through the probability P(q,s) of being found guilty
of insuﬃcient safety care or negligence if an accident occurs and the bank sues the ﬁrm; and
third, through the cost Q(q)t h eﬁrm incurs for exerting safety care level q.




giving rise to the best reply function q(ν | α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B) to the choice of ν made
by the bank and of α and s set by the government.
The expected return of the bank on its loan to the ﬁrm depends on the probability that it will
sue the ﬁrm, on the probability that the ﬁrm will be found guilty if sued, and on the probability
that the ﬁrm makes high proﬁts. Since proﬁts will not be observed unless the ﬁrm is not meeting
its obligations to the bank, the probability that the bank will sue the ﬁrm in the accident state
will not depend on the level of those proﬁts. However, the expected beneﬁts of suing depends
on the expected capacity of the ﬁrm to avoid bankruptcy if found guilty by the court, that is,




considering the best reply care level function q(ν | α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B)o ft h eﬁrm. The
solution to conditions (4) and (3) give us the second stage equilibrium values of variables ν and q
17This is hte natural assumption to make here. Indeed, banks typically determine their suing policy well in
advance of determining a given ﬁrm risk class and therefore the terms of its loan. This policy must be assumed
to be well known by ﬁrms.23
as functions of the government-determined variables α and s,n a m e l y :ν∗(α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B)
and q∗(α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B).
The ﬁrst stage
We are now ready to deﬁne the government objective function (social welfare function) and
characterize the optimal liability sharing value α∗ and the optimal safety standard s∗.W ew i l l
assume that the determination of the liability sharing formula involves a “political economy”
cost A(α) if the government wants to implement a formula which moves away from the most
acceptable formula from a social or political standpoint (assumed below to correspond to an
equal liability sharing). The political correctness of the sharing formula is a social constraint
that is quite realistic in the present context. The cost itself corresponds to the eﬀorts necessary
to convince the population of ﬁrms and banks of the desirability of the intended liability sharing
formula.
The social welfare function SWF is composed of the total gross beneﬁts W from allowing the
ﬁrm to operate minus the expected cost of an accident, the cost of the ﬁrm’s safety eﬀort q,t h e
cost of the bank’s strategy ν, the political cost of diverging from the most socially acceptable
liability sharing, the ﬁrm’s expected costs of litigation, and the cost of public funds necessary
to cover that part of the cost of an accident which is covered neither by the ﬁrm nor by the
bank. This last cost is proportional to the amount disbursed by the government in case of an
accident under the assumption that the government will one way or another cover the cost of an
accident (clean up costs and compensation of victims) not covered by the total payments made
by the ﬁrm and the bank. This cost of public funds therefore depends on whether the bank sues
the ﬁrm or not and in the former case on whether the ﬁrm is found guilty of negligence or not,
a n do nw h e t h e rt h eﬁrm goes bankrupt or not following the occurrence of an accident and the24
decision of the court. The SWF(α,s)i sg i v e nb y :
SWF(α,s)=W − p(q∗)L − Q(q∗) − C(ν∗) − A(α)
−λp(q∗)
h
(1 − ν∗)μmax{0,α L − (π1 − (1 + r)K − Q(q∗))}




0,α L − max{0,π 1 − (1 + r)K − CF − Q(q∗)}
o
(5)
where ν∗ = ν∗(α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B)a n dq∗ = q∗(α,s; K,r,π1,π 2,μ,L,C F,C B).
The government chooses the liability sharing factor α and the standard of care s to maximize







The above modelization clearly includes many institutional and informational constraints. We
want to compare the solution obtained in the diﬀerent cases (parameter values) not only between
themselves but also with the ﬁrst-best solution. The ﬁrst-best solution is obtained under full
information when the government chooses directly the level of safety eﬀort q and the value of
α which maximizes social welfare. From the above, the ﬁrst best least cost value of α,n a m e l y
αFB, is the one minimizing A(α). As for the optimal value of q, it corresponds simply to the
value which minimizes the expected cost of an accident plus the cost of safety itself, that is the
value qFB satisﬁes p0(qFB)L + Q0(qFB) = 0. The cost of public funds λ p l a y sn or o l eh e r es i n c e
under full information, one can assume that λ =0 .25
5A s i m p l i ﬁed realistic case
Characterizing the best government strategy under the above institutional and informational
constraints is a daunting, possibly impossible endeavor. Rather than pursue such a goal here, we
will rather tackle a more limited but more tractable task, namely obtaining numerical best values
of α in a simpliﬁed but realistic case. Clearly, this is a ﬁrst step in a long journey. But we like to
believe that it is a useful step if one aims at characterizing the complex set of forces which govern
the intricate relationships underlying the determination of industrial/environmental accidents
as seen for a social point of view.
We ﬁrst present the numerical function we will use in the simulations and then show their
properties in an attempt to convince the reader that the functions are suﬃciently realistic and
ﬂexible to account for many signiﬁcant real situations. Let us consider the following functions:




= p0, if q =0
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=1 , if q =0
= e−δ, if q = s (P(s,s)=0 .5i fδ = ln2)
→ 0, as q becomes very large
(8)
Q(q) ≡ zqb where b>1a n dz is some positive parameter. (9)
C(ν) ≡ Bνn. (10)
A(α) ≡ A(α − 0,5)a (11)
The probability p(q) of an accident is assumed to be between pM and p0,w h e r epM is the
minimum unavoidable probability level representing the eﬀect of all causal factors still at work26
when care is as large as it can be, and p0 is the probability of an accident when the ﬁrm exerts no
care (p0 >p M)w i t hp0(q)=η(pM −p0)e−ηq < 0a n dp00(q)=−η2(pM −p0)e−ηq > 0. Parameter
η measures the eﬃciency of care in reducing the probability of an accident.
The probability P(q,s) that the court will ﬁnd the ﬁrm guilty of insuﬃcient care satisﬁes the
following desirable and/or realistic properties, namely:
(i) it decreases at a decreasing rate with care q (from 1, when the ﬁrm exert no care, toward 0,
when the level of care becomes very large), so that both errors of type 1 (ﬁnding a ﬁrm with




Pqq(q,s)=( δ/s)2e−δ(q/s) > 0;
(ii) it increases with the safety standard s with
Ps(q,s)=( δq/s2)e−δ(q/s) > 0,
Pss(q,s)=[ ( δq/s2)2 − (2sδq)/s4]e−δ(q/s),
the latter being positive if s<1
2δq [that is, the increase in the standard increases the probability
of conviction, given the level of care q, at an increasing rate if s is relatively small] and negative
if s>1
2δq [that is the increase in the standard increases the probability of conviction, given the
level of care q, at a decreasing rate if s is relatively large];
(iii)w h e nq = s, it is constant at e−δ for all s (it is equal to 0.5 if δ = ln2);
(iv)m o r e o v e r ,i ts a t i s ﬁes
Pqs(q,s)=[ ( δ/s2)(1 − δq/s)]e−δ(q/s),
which is positive if δq < s [that is the increase in the standard, given the level of care q, decreases
the marginal eﬃciency of care in reducing the probability of conviction if s is relatively large]
and negative if δq > s [that is the increase in the standard, given the level of care q,i n c r e a s e s
the marginal eﬃciency of care in reducing the probability of conviction if s is relatively small].27
Hence, for δ = ln2, an increase in the standard s increases the eﬃciency of safety care in
reducing the probability of conviction iﬀ the level of safety care q is above (ln2)s ≈ 0.6931s,i n
which case an increase in the government determined standard would induce the ﬁrm to increase
ceteris paribus its level of safety care. If the level of safety care q is below that critical level,
an increase in the government determined standard would induce the ﬁrm to decrease its safety
care level, the reason being that it becomes more costly at the margin to avoid being convicted
of negligence.
T h ec o s to fc a r ef u n c t i o nQ(q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nq at an increasing [decreasing] rate if b>[<]1.
So, parameter b measures the economies/diseconomies of scale which may be present in care
programs and activities. As to parameter z, it simply measures the linear cost eﬃciency of care.
The bank’s litigation service cost function C(ν) increases in the probability that the bank will
indeed sue a client ﬁr mr e s p o n s i b l ef o ra na c c i d e n t .T ob ea b l et od os oe ﬃciently, we assume
that the bank has at all times an internal legal service whose size depends on ν and whose cost
increases with ν at an increasing [decreasing] rate if n>[<]1. Hence, parameter n measures
the economies/diseconomies of scale which may be present in the bank’s litigation capacity.
Parameter B simply measures the linear cost eﬃciency of litigation capacity.
Finally, the political economy cost function of a given value of liability sharing is assumed to
be minimized when liability is shared half and half between the parties, namely the bank and
the ﬁrm here. Clearly, other “politically correct liability sharing” reference points could be
envisaged.
The socially optimal liability sharing value α∗ and the optimal safety standard s∗ can then be
related to the parameters. We can run some comparative statics and illustrate the results in
tables. That is what we do next. Among all possibilities, we will concentrate on the impact of
the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm (represented by parameter μ, the probability that the project/ﬁrm
generate a low level of proﬁto rb e n e ﬁt), the cost of care activities (represented by parameter z28
appearing in Q(q), the cost of care function), the eﬃciency of care in reducing the probability of
accident (represented by parameter η appearing in p(q), the probability of accident), the bank’s
cost of monitoring the ﬁrm’s care activities (measured indirectly here by parameter B appearing
in the cost C(ν) incurred by the bank for maintaining a legal service, that is, a court litigation
capacity as well as the expected costs of litigation and court procedures themselves), and ﬁnally
the social cost of public funds (represented by parameter λ).
We ﬁrst illustrate a base case scenario (Case 1) in Table 1.
Case 1. Parameters: π1 = 1000, π2 = 5000, μ =0 .2, K = 75, r =0 .1, p0 =0 .4, pM =0 .05,
δ = ln(2), z =1 0 ,b =1 .2, L = 4000, η =0 .2, CF =0 ,B =1 ,n =2 ,λ =0 .3, A = 25,
a =2 ;f o u rv a l u e so fs, namely 6, 10, 18, 28. We obtain the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17,
p(qFB)=0 .0751, and
[Insert Table 1: Base case scenario]
This base case scenario shows among other things that if the liability share of the ﬁrm increases,
then as expected the bank chooses a lower probability of suing ν,w h i l et h eﬁrm chooses a higher
level of safety care, implying a lower probability of accident and a lower probability, for a given
level of recommended care s, of being found guilty by the court in case the ﬁrm is taken to
court by the bank. This translates into a level of social welfare which ﬁrst increases and then
decreases, under the combined opposite eﬀects of a lower probability of accident and a higher
cost of care activities. Table 1 shows also the eﬀect on the equilibrium values of variables α, ν
and q of diﬀerent levels of care recommended by the government. The maximal social welfare
is obtained when the government chooses s =1 8a n dα = 35%, thereby inducing the bank to
choose a relatively high probability of litigation of 91%; those values of α, s and ν induce the
ﬁrm to exert a relatively low level of care at 11.987 which implies a probability of accident of
8.2% and a probability of conviction for negligence of 63%. It is interesting to note here that29
the levels α and s are both lower than their ﬁrst best values, which in this base case scenario are
respectively 50% and 13.17 implying a ﬁrst best probability of accident of 7.5%. For low [high]
values of s, the government sets the ﬁrm’s liability share above [below] its full information ﬁrst
best level.
Case 2. Parameters: same as Case 1 except for μ which varies between 0.1 and 0.3 and s which
is ﬁxed at s = 10; we obtain the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751, and
[Insert Table 2: variable μ]
We look in this case at the eﬀect of a lower proﬁtability of the ﬁrm on the social welfare
maximizing liability sharing (considering the level of recommended care ﬁxed exogenously at
s = 10) and equilibrium levels of litigation probability ν and care q. As the proﬁtability of
the ﬁrm/project decreases (as μ increases), liability is transferred from the ﬁrm to the bank,
inducing the latter to increase the litigation probability. The net eﬀect of these conﬂicting forces
on the ﬁrm’s incentives for care is to lower the level of care, thereby increasing the probability of
accident and the probability of conviction for negligence. The latter probability remains lower
than 50% though since the level of care chosen by the ﬁrm remains higher than the recommended
level s = 10. The incomplete information and partial control social welfare maximizing liability
sharing between the ﬁrm and the bank falls mainly on the ﬁrm when the ﬁrm/project is very
proﬁtable (μ small) but falls mainly on the bank when it is not (μ large).
Case 3. Parameters: same as Case 1 except for z which varies between 5 and 20 and s which is
ﬁxed at s = 10; we obtain the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB variable, p(qFB)v a r i a b l e ,a n d
[Insert Table 3: variable z]
We consider in case 3 the eﬀect of increasing parameter z which translates into higher cost of30
care activities. Although the ﬁrst best level of liability sharing remains at 50%, the ﬁrst best
level of care decreases with z and therefore the probability of accident increases with z.T h e
liability share of the bank increases with z, inducing it to increase the probability of litigation.
The net eﬀect of these three factors (higher z,l o w e rα,h i g h e rν) is to induce the ﬁrm to reduce
its care level, thereby increasing the probability of accident and the probability of conviction
for negligence which goes from under to over 50% as the level of care goes from higher to lower
than the recommended level s =1 0 .
Case 4. Parameters: same as Case 1 except for η which varies between 0.1 and 0.3; we obtain
the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB variable, p(qFB) variable, and
[Insert Table 4: variable η]
We report in table 4 the results of a greater eﬃciency of care in reducing the probability of
accident (higher η). The ﬁrst best level of care, therefore the probability of accident, is sensitive
to increases in η as the higher eﬃciency of care could allow for a reduction in care and therefore
the cost of care, with no cost in terms of probability of accident. We observe that the ﬁrst best
level of care indeed decreases with η.T h ec o m b i n e de ﬀects of the increase in η and the reduction
in ﬁrst best care level qFB is to decrease the ﬁrst best probability of accident. As the eﬃciency of
care increases, the incomplete information and partial control social welfare maximizing liability
share of the ﬁrm decreases while the probability of litigation ﬁrst increases and then decreases.
The net eﬀects on the equilibrium level of care is to reduce it while reducing also the probability
of accident, which nevertheless remains higher than the decreasing the ﬁrst best levels. As the
level of care falls due to the increase in the eﬃciency of care, the probability of conviction in
litigated cases increases.
Case 5. Parameters: same as Case 1 except for B which varies between 0.5 and 2.5; we obtain
the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751, and31
[Insert Table 5: variable B]
We illustrate in this case the eﬀects of increases in the cost of the bank’s litigation capacity
(including court costs). As the cost parameter B increases, we observe that the incomplete
information and partial control social welfare maximizing liability share of the ﬁrm increases
while the probability of litigation by the bank drops, inducing a non-monotonic eﬀect on the
level of care exerted by the ﬁrm, as well as on the probability of accident, over the 0.5 to 1.5
range of B values. The non-monotonicity in the social welfare function implies that there is a
discontinuity in the optimal liability share of the ﬁrm which jumps suddenly to 1 somewhere
between B =2a n dB =2 .5.
Case 6. Parameters: same as Case 1 except for λ which varies between 0.1 and 0.5; we obtain
the following: αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751, and
[Insert Table 6: variable λ]
Finally, we show in table 6 the results of increases in λ, the parameter representing the social
cost of public funds. In the full information ﬁrst best solution, the cost of public funds is
irrelevant since it can be assumed to be 0. Hence the ﬁrst best level of q is not sensitive to
changes in λ. But under the informational and regulatory (control) constraints considered here,
the eﬃciency of the taxation system is relevant insofar as the government may be called to cover
part of both the clean up costs and the compensation of victims if an accident occurs. As Table
6 illustrates, increases in the social opportunity cost of public funds parameter λ reduces the
welfare maximizing value of the liability share of the ﬁrm, prompting the bank to increases its
probability of litigation in case of accident. The lower liability share of the ﬁrm combined with
the higher probability of litigation induces the ﬁrm to reduce its care activities while maintaining
them at a level above the exogenously ﬁxed recommended level s = 10 in order to avoid too
large an increase in the probability of conviction for negligence. Nevertheless, the probability of32
accident increases as well as the probability of conviction. A higher λ induces the government
to increase the liability share of the bank in order to avoid having to cover, at a higher social
cost, the accident damages that the judgment-proof ﬁrm may impose on the government.
6 Conclusion
The importance of the debate about the choice of instruments in the environmental realm
stems from the accelerating diﬀusion of environmentally risky production activities in modern
industrial societies and the ensuing necessity to properly compensate the victims of accidents.
To those elements, must be added the need to induce an eﬃcient level of care by the potential
injurers in contexts characterized by asymmetric information and partial control. Finally, and
perhaps equally important, these issues and their analysis are important, in particular in the light
of the challenging attempt by EC countries to design and implement a common environmental
protection system.
The game being played by the four actors, namely governments, ﬁrms, banks, and courts,
involves a set of complex interactions between them in the determination of industrial accidents.
Although the modeling strategy we followed here is admittedly not the only possible way to make
explicit the interactions between the four players, we believe that our modeling strategy captures
many if not all the important characteristics, stemming from institutional and informational
constraints, of a large number of real situations. The level of complexity in the interactions
between the four players is signiﬁcant, in particular in terms of the ﬁrm’s limited liability, the
asymmetric information on safety care levels chosen by ﬁrms and the proﬁts made by ﬁrms, and
the diﬃculty for courts to ascertain through the litigation process the level of care a ﬁrm has
eﬀectively exerted.
Nevertheless, we were able, through realistic numerical cases, to derive statements regarding
the socially eﬃcient government policies for industrial safety and the way those policies interact33
with the private interests of banks and ﬁrms as well as the imperfection of the court system. We
characterized in particular the socially eﬃcient liability sharing formula and standard of safety
care, based on the interactions between the banks and the ﬁrms and on the eﬃciency of the
courts in assessing the level of care exerted by the ﬁrm.
Our main results is to characterize, in a series of comparative statics exercises on a simpliﬁed but
realistic functional example, the determination of the liability sharing between the ﬁrm and the
bank. We showed that the incomplete information and partial control social welfare maximizing
liability or ﬁnancial responsibility share of the bank increases as the recommended level of care s
increases, as the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm decreases, as the cost of care increases, as the eﬃciency
of care increases, and as the social cost of public funds increases.
Hence, our results indicates or suggests that the government would be justiﬁed to implement
an extended lender liability regime,18 or more generally a ﬁnancial responsibility regime, or
more speciﬁcally a reduced and more restrictive ﬁrm liability in favor of an increased and more
extensive lender liability for environmental accidents, the higher the recommended level of care
is, the more stringent and aggressive the courts are instructed to be with regards to ﬁrms’
conviction for negligence, the less proﬁtable the ﬁrm/project is (insofar as the ﬁrm is allowed to
operate, that is, is globally proﬁtable), the higher the cost of care is, the higher the eﬃciency
of care is in reducing the probability of industrial/environmental accidents, the smaller the cost
for the bank of maintaining a litigation capacity (including the court costs), and the higher the
social cost of public funds is.
18See Boyer and Porrini (2004) for an analysis of factors favoring an extended lender liability regime over a
regulatory regime subject to capture by the regulatees.34
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T a b l e1 :B a s ec a s es c e n a r i o
[ αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751 ]
α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
s =6
0.05 0.918 10.343 3558.29 0.094 0.303
0.25 0.898 10.830 3570.93 0.090 0.286
0.45 0.869 11.215 3575.20 0.087 0.274
0.65 0.820 11.611 3576.53 0.084 0.261
0.75 0.776 11.814 3576.28 0.083 0.255
0.95 0.445 12.251 3574.53 0.080 0.243
s =1 0
0.05 0.926 11.187 3567.00 0.087 0.461
0.25 0.908 11.522 3576.91 0.085 0.450
0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.084 0.444
0.65 0.852 11.933 3577.48 0.082 0.437
0.75 0.821 12.043 3576.45 0.081 0.434
0.95 0.577 12.296 3573.94 0.080 0.426
∗∗s =1 8∗∗
0.05 0.929 11.809 3572.97 0.083 0.635
0.25 0.917 11.943 3578.52 0.082 0.631
0.35 0.910 11.987 3579.03 0.082 0.630
0.55 0.889 12.081 3578.27 0.081 0.628
0.75 0.847 12.187 3575.98 0.081 0.625
0.95 0.648 12.327 3573.31 0.080 0.622
s =2 8
0.05 0.932 12.001 3573.43 0.082 0.743
0.25 0.922 12.084 3578.44 0.081 0.741
0.35 0.915 12.110 3578.81 0.081 0.741
0.55 0.896 12.167 3577.90 0.081 0.740
0.75 0.858 12.236 3575.53 0.080 0.739
0.95 0.676 12.338 3572.94 0.797 0.73739
Table 2: variable μ
[ αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751 ]
μ α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
0.10 0.65 0.855 12.310 3983.42 0.080 0.426
0.15 0.55 0.873 12.016 3580.83 0.082 0.435
0.20 0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.084 0.444
0.25 0.35 0.898 11.432 3375.84 0.086 0.453
0.30 0.30 0.903 11.189 3173.48 0.087 0.460
Table 3: variable z
z (αFB, qFB, p(qFB)) α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
5.0 (0.5, 16.417, 0.063) 0.45 0.860 14.885 3707.87 0.068 0.356
7.5 (0.5, 14.513, 0.069) 0.45 0.876 13.008 3638.74 0.076 0.406
10.0 (0.5, 13.171, 0.075) 0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.084 0.444
12.5 (0.5, 12.137, 0.081) 0.45 0.895 10.752 3524.11 0.091 0.475
15.0 (0.5, 11.298, 0.087) 0.40 0.907 9.934 3474.78 0.098 0.502
17.5 (0.5, 10.591, 0.092) 0.40 0.912 9.292 3429.48 0.105 0.525
20.0 (0.5, 9.983, 0.098) 0.35 0.920 8.714 3387.53 0.111 0.547
Table 4: variable η
η (αFB, qFB, p(qFB)) α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
0.10 (0.5, 18.709, 0.104) 0.65 0.865 16.056 3737.42 0.120 0.329
0.15 (0.5, 15.433, 0.085) 0.55 0.877 13.524 3490.49 0.096 0.392
0.20 (0.5, 13.171, 0.075) 0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.084 0.444
0.25 (0.5, 11.536, 0.070) 0.40 0.890 10.439 3635.30 0.076 0.485
0.30 (0.5, 10.297, 0.066) 0.40 0.888 9.456 3675.29 0.070 0.51940
Table 5: variable B
[ αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751 ]
B α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
0.5 0.40 0.938 11.746 3581.58 0.084 0.443
1.0 0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.085 0.444
1.5 0.55 0.845 11.777 3575.93 0.083 0.442
2.0 0.60 0.809 11.793 3574.10 0.082 0.441
2.5 1.00 0.000 12.413 3572.71 0.079 0.423
Table 6: variable λ
[ αFB =0 .5, qFB =1 3 .17, p(qFB)=0 .0751 ]
λ α ν q SWF p(q) P(q,s)
0.10 0.75 0.821 12.043 3583.05 0.081 0.434
0.20 0.60 0.863 11.879 3580.22 0.083 0.439
0.30 0.45 0.887 11.723 3578.30 0.084 0.444
0.40 0.30 0.904 11.571 3577.26 0.085 0.448
0.50 0.30 0.904 11.571 3676.84 0.085 0.448